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1. Introduction 
The analysis of environmental issues inevitably requires the contribution of an array of 
scientific disciplines. The experimental sciences, whose goal is the knowledge of natural 
phenomena, cannot aspire, alone, to resolve the problems raised by interactions between 
human societies and nature. Nor can the social sciences claim any monopoly thereto. This is 
particularly true of our industrial societies, which ceaselessly produce what Ulrich Beck 
calls “latent induced effects” (1986) which engender long term environmental and health 
hazards. Their understanding is always belated. It is very often achieved by expertise in 
experimental sciences, intersecting with the wisdom of common sense, social mobilisations, 
and the weight of prevailing social norms (Wynne, 1997). Their extent and lastingness 
accordingly result from the combination of two factors, one being determined by the other. 
One factor include the limits, at any time, to the knowledge and predictions that they make 
possible, in terms of the future trend of a given industrial process ; other factor, the social 
relationships of production and reproduction whereby this industrial process is 
implemented by relying on the prior art, but also on prevalent beliefs and ideologies. 
These social relationships also produce social values and norms. Under the impact of the 
rapport between capital and labour, they sustain the subdivisions inherent in any process of 
industrial production and in its organisation between experts and laymen, producers and 
consumers, particularly via legitimating arguments (Braverman, 1975). The sociological 
analysis of environmental issues requires an understanding of the dynamic of these social 
relationships through the examination of their tensions and conflicts which, very often, are 
crystallised in these dialectical forms. It must be considered as complementary to the 
analysis of the nature sciences, without one ever substituting for the other. It is in this 
perspective that we propose to analyse the production process of the uranium industry, a 
vital link in the production of nuclear energy. We shall focus particularly on its remnants. 
We shall show that the qualification of radioactive waste which henceforth attaches to them 
results from practices of the players within changing configurations, to varying degrees 
conflictual. The challenge concerns the hegemony of legitimacy to say and to do with regard 
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to their management. This perspective accordingly implies carrying out a long range 
analysis to grasp their evolution. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first describes the emergence of the problematics, 
in which science, technology, politics and standards are combined in a scheme of specific 
production relationships. It dwells on the early decades of the atomic complex, to grasp its 
various structural components and, ultimately, to understand the function of the radioactive 
waste qualification process. The second part expands the analysis of this mechanism over 
the long term, based on the case of France. The focus is then directed at the least known 
productive segment of the nuclear complex, the uranium mining industry, and on its 
repercussions in terms of waste. 
2. Science, politics and standards concerned with radioactive waste:  
A new horizon  
By virtue of its history, and its underlying scientific knowledge and techniques, the atomic 
industry, later called the nuclear industry, is linked with the state of war. This is why no 
doubt more than any other, this industry has been ambivalent since its inception. It is 
oriented towards destruction as well as production (Naville, 1977). This attribute is 
especially pronounced as the structure becomes recursive. Indeed, the earliest large atomic 
facilities that went on stream in the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France, were plants 
simultaneously generating plutonium and electricity for military and civilian uses (Barillot 
and Davis, 1994). Similarly, the environmental and health hazards associated with the 
concept of energy generation were precisely the “arguments”, amply demonstrated in 
practice, of its capacity to destroy at a hitherto unsuspected scale. This finding became the 
background for the many descriptions, popularisations and justifications of the new 
industry (Ducrocq, 1948; Martin, 1956; Goldschmidt, 1962), giving rise to many 
consequences that we shall examine in turn, and globally. First, the control of this industry 
was directly assumed by the States and associations thereof, in peacetime and wartime alike. 
Second, its technological and strategic sophistication generated an intensive and tight 
interpenetration of different professional worlds: scientific, military, industrial and political. 
This tense closed world reflected the elitist, in other words, non-democratic, relationship 
that became established for decisions pertaining to this industry. And finally, its 
ambivalence marked an associated process: the qualification of “radioactive waste”. The 
narrow perimeter in which it was long contained caused the slowness of its development, 
and also, in exchange, the deep democratic penetration that it received.  
2.1 The atomic and nuclear industry: A matter for States at the planetary scale  
After the Second World War, the atomic industry developed essentially in obedience to 
geostrategic and military objectives. A differentiation set in between States according to 
whether or not they possessed the atomic weapon and its uranium fuel. This cleavage was 
not exclusively of a technical or economic nature. It was also political, and had two 
outcomes. States owning atomic weapons sought to hamper the access of other candidate 
states to the possession of the industrial process. It hence ordered and crystallised the global 
ranking of the military powers. This situation still prevails today. For example, the sanctions 
imposed against Iran since 2006 by the UN Security Council, claimed justification in the fact 
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that these countries had tried or were trying to possess a military nuclear industry (IAEA, 
2006). It also fostered a policy of secrecy which was gradually relaxed to facilitate civilian 
industrial applications.  
This unprecedented situation betokened a new relationship between science, industry and 
politics, with an implication of international controls. The sharing of the world in fact 
established new geostrategic relations between East and West. Its equilibrium depended on 
the resources available to each camp to develop the industrial process. Before the war, the 
Belgian mines of Upper Katanga enjoyed a monopoly of radium production. The 
importance gained by uranium as a fuel then encouraged the USA to control its production. 
Despite the discoveries in Canada and Czechoslovakia, uranium was held to be a rare ore 
(Ducrocq, 1948). Thus, wishing to maintain a lead, which it wrongly believed to be 
significant in terms of the technology and the uranium raw material, the USA tried to 
impose its point of view, which only Great Britain and Canada accepted. Faced with the 
refusal of the USSR, which controlled Czech uranium, the USA decided to maintain its lead 
by practising a policy of secrecy (Goldschmidt, 1962). Indeed, in late July 1946, a law was 
passed organising and governing atomic energy in the USA (the MacMahon Bill). All the 
problems of atomic energy, from ore to nuclear fuel, plants included, fell under its authority. 
Secrecy was maintained, and its violation decreed a capital crime. Finally, the new Bill 
enshrined isolationism: collaboration with other countries was subject to Congressional 
approval. This is why from 1946 to July 1954, when the law was first relaxed, even 
collaboration with English speaking countries was suspended (Goldschmidt, 1962). This 
policy of secrecy became the international norm. In September 1949, the Russians showed 
the American that they no longer held exclusive sway. The battle for power and 
technological sophistication was then joined on a new project based on the thermonuclear 
reaction, leading to the hydrogen bomb, a thousand times more powerful than the A bomb. 
At the same time, in 1952, Great Britain broke into the closed club of the atomic countries, 
followed by France in 1960. This policy of secrecy contained its contradictions. Thus, from 
the 1950s, the US proposed the Baruch plan to the United Nations (Goldschmidt, 1987). It 
offered to relinquish atomic secrecy provided that an international agency took charge of the 
ownership of the uranium mines, atomic materials, and the running of fuel production 
plants and power reactors. The USSR was opposed and demanded that the USA destroy its 
arsenal and terminate the arms race. The American proposal was doomed to failure. 
Certainly, it foreshadowed the various UN regulatory agencies that were progressively set 
up in the atomic field. This necessity stemmed from the ambivalence of its industry. In 
terms of destruction, the UN Security Council contained the five foremost historic atomic 
powers as permanent members1. They therefore “monitored” the balance of global forces 
under the sign of secrecy and mutual mistrust. In terms of production, civilian industrial 
development could not durably be a subject issue. This conflict was partly resolved at the 
first international conference in Geneva in 1955, Atoms for Peace. The disparateness of its 
participants and the scheduling of its deliberations (first, states and after Scientists) were 
symptomatic of its social intricacy and hierarchy, which promoted the existence of the 
industry, born in the USA in 1943.  
                                                 
1 The list of five permanent members was approved in 1946, long before they became atomic powers. 
However, the correlation is striking, and the sign of a suite in the state power ranking. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Radioactive Waste 
 
22
2.2 The atomic and nuclear industry, a heterogeneous and closed visage  
Its starting point was the Manhattan Project. This project was its parent-formula. It associated 
four different types of social actors, not without some tension: State (for political decisions), 
Industry (the Du Pont company engineers for the practical organisation of the industrial 
process at Oak Ridge, Tennessee), Scientists (for their investigations), and the Military (for 
their responsibility in management and control) (N’diaye, 1998). Subsequent industrial 
developments, each inserted into their specific national frameworks, were differentiated 
from this initial wartime model. But, with it, they shared the principle of ambivalence 
between destruction and production, of the disparateness of the social actors, and finally, 
the closure of this new productive world sustained by the policy of secrecy. The French 
model was no exception.  
Certainly, for no science other than nuclear physics, was the era of its fundamental and 
theoretical questions and that of its practical applications so intermingled, jump-starting the 
production of destructive bombs. This unprecedented situation was marked by 
contradictions and internal tensions, particularly the ambiguous attitudes of the scientists 
(Martin, 1956). In August 1939, Einstein sent a letter, co-signed by other physicists, to US 
President Roosevelt, to alert him to the risk of some day finding Nazi Germany in 
possession of the atom bomb. He decided to move swiftly. This act triggered a process of 
decisions culminating in the Manhattan Project in 1942, in other words, the production of the 
bomb. It is estimated that 75 000 to 150 000 people were mobilised, particularly in the Oak 
Ridge plant, until the explosion of the first bomb in New Mexico (Goldschmidt, 1962; 
N’Diaye, 1998). The scientists, with the army and the industry, were joined under the aegis 
of the political authority. This created some ambiguity in the attitudes of the scientists in 
three respects. On the one hand, while nothing in the atomic field could be done without 
them, its future was beyond their control. On the other, the practical and ideological 
underpinnings of their professional integrity were denied. This applied to unrestricted 
access to information and its exchange in the name of priority over the policy of secrecy, and 
disinterestedness in the name of limited commitment. They tried morally to resolve this 
contradictory positioning in many ways: through justification, through guilt, or even by 
engaging in peace movements like Pugwash and the Stockholm Appeal (Oppenheimer, 1955; 
Joliot-Curie, 1963; Einstein, 1979).  
Similarly, the first international conference in Geneva in 1955, Atoms for Peace, which 
brought together seventy-two countries, tried to resolve the internal contradiction of the 
atomic complex internationally. It partly relaxed the policy of secrecy and thereby met the 
desires of the scientists. It made possible the recursiveness of destruction towards 
production. It timidly addressed the latent induced effects of radioactivity on human health. 
Its deliberations nevertheless reflected the ambivalence of the atomic complex and the 
ranking of its players. First, the governments of the atomic countries (USA, Great Britain, 
USSR and France) held a week-long meeting in July; followed by the scientists and 
industrialists for twelve days on the civilian applications of the atom. No other social or 
associative force was invited to the discussion table, confining the issues exclusively in the 
hands of the experts and political decision makers. 
These ingredients of the atomic complex could be found in the French formula, delayed and 
with specific characteristics. In October 1945, Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) was 
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created under the unchallenged authority of Frédéric Joliot-Curie2. Its programme was that 
of atomic science and its civilian applications. The problem of fuel remained to be solved. 
The CEA had a limited stock of heavy water and uranium in a context of a uranium 
embargo. France accordingly launched a prospecting programme: 
“Dig everywhere without second thoughts. Have no qualms about your prospecting 
methods. Besides, if I could, I would send out 2000 prospectors throughout France! 
They would systematically scour the soil with a Geiger counter, from the Pas-de-Calais 
to the Pyrenees! Not a single clue of uranium could elude me!”  
This was Joliot-Curie’s exhortation to the first class of uranium prospectors trained from 
December 1945 (Paucard, 1994). Until 1950, when Joliot-Curie was dismissed for political 
and geostrategic reasons, and even beyond, scientists resisted government pressures 
concerning the assigned objectives. The challenge was the atom bomb and the military 
presence in the CEA. But, progressively, through the Fifties, the CEA industrialised, 
militarised and finally escaped the control of the scientists, now more relevant to the initial 
model promoted by the U.S. So, By government decree in 1951, the CEA was led by a 
director and no longer by a scientist. In 1955, the government created the consultative 
commission for the Production of Energy of Nuclear Origin (PEON commission). It is 
reporting to the government and tasked with supplying justified opinions on decisions to be 
taken. Also, the government named a military man to direct the CEA’s general design office: 
in 1958 this office became the CEA’s Directorate of Military Applications (DAM), charged 
with setting up France’s nuclear weapons programme. After much procrastination, the 
French government decided to build the atom bomb. The return of General De Gaulle to 
power in 1958 accelerated the process. Symptomatically, the CEA’s director general, P. 
Guillaumat, was appointed minister of the Armed Forces by de Gaulle in his new 
Government. Two years later, in 1960, France exploded a bomb in the Algerian Sahara for 
the first time. In doing so, it joined the club of the four world nuclear powers. It thus marked 
a crucial step of its scientific, technological and geostrategic history in its quest for 
international “radiance” (Hecht, 1997). 
2.3 The atomic and nuclear industry: Qualifying waste and measuring risks  
The concerns that initiated the “radioactive waste” qualification process were present from 
the outset of the atomic complex, in forms both extensive and unstable. However, they fit 
into a matrix in which the development of atomic weapons and the corresponding secrecy 
policies predominated3. They were directed towards radioactive materials in use as well as 
those already used and non-reusable, insofar as they all incurred health hazards. The 
scientists, engineers and experts, associated with nuclear facilities, investigated and 
controlled this qualification process. They set up a system of standards and practices to 
which the governments adhered. Over the long term, this framework stiffened in a context 
of pressures. This was because a shift in the reference threshold of health and environmental 
hazards was observed, correlated with a deep public sensitivity, organised or not. In this 
                                                 
2 He was Nobel co-laureate in 1935 with his wife, Irène, for the discovery of artificial radioactivity. 
During the German Occupation, F. Joliot-Curie secretly joined the Communist party. 
3 An example, among many others, is the circulation of books aimed at the public for protection against 
the atomic radiation from a bomb. They were generally written by the military. (Gibrin, 1953) 
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respect, the radioactive waste qualification process was characterised by a democratic 
penetration that affected the entire nuclear complex.  
Without any doubt, the starting point of this process was located in a twofold prolongation. 
One was the international meetings between experts of the new industry, which became 
institutionalised, either under the UN or in the form of inter-State treaties in the Fifties 
(Goldschmidt, 1987)4. The aim was to standardize practices to conform to the development 
of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It was also a symptom of the public response. In 
fact, the weight of the military industry and its meshing with the civilian industry limited 
the quality of available knowledge, the social relationship to this knowledge, and the 
transparency of the information (Barillot and Davis, 1994). Let us examine these various 
aspects through three examples in France.  
The multiplication of thermonuclear bomb tests came under strong criticism from some of 
the atomic scientists, who mobilised internationally. Soil contamination by radioactive 
fallout was condemned with the health hazards associated with the food chain. For 
example, Linus Pauling, Nobel laureate, in an international conference of conscientious 
objectors in Germany in June 1959, declared:  
“The government leader who issues the order to explode an experimental atom bomb 
must realise that it simultaneously condemns 15 000 children yet unborn to suffer 
serious physical or spiritual handicaps and to have a painful and miserable existence” 
[press article in Echo du Centre, 2 July 1959]. 
This topic was a pressing concern in the Fifties in France. It was expressed in the political 
and peaceful battles against atomic weapons. It also raised public awareness about the 
problems raised by radioactivity. A split accordingly occurred between the good and bad 
users of the atom, depending on whether they derived respectively from civilian or military 
applications (Joliot-Curie, 1963). Public attention to the health risks engendered by 
radioactivity was therefore structured differentially. Notwithstanding this, it forced the CEA 
to install devices to record the radioactivity produced by this fallout across the country.  
Another pressing topic was the dumping at sea of radioactive waste. This method, common 
to the atomic countries, applied the principle of dilution (Quéneudec, 1965). It was part of an 
initial presumption of the growth of industrial capitalism. Nature’s power of absorption is 
infinite (Beck, 1986). In October 1960, French press reports that the CEA is planning, in its 
own words, an experiment to submerge 6 500 drums of low level radioactive waste in the 
Mediterranean Sea [Echo du Centre, October 12, 1960]. In actual fact, from the onset of the 
Fifties and in secret, the CEA was already implementing the dilution principle by dumping 
waste into the rivers. The publicity shed on this project sparked a strong reaction from the 
population concerned: elected officials as well as scientists, biologists and oceanographers in 
particular, demanded that the Government shelve the experiment. The Minister for Atomic 
Energy had to explain matters before the Parliament:  
                                                 
4 Without claiming to be complete, examples include UNSCEAR created in 1955 by the UN. Its role was 
to assess the levels and the effects of exposure to radioactivity. The IAEA, created in 1957 by the UN 
also, promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. EURATOM, created in 1957 by Europe, was a body 
that coordinated research programmes on nuclear energy and accompanied the growth of the civilian 
nuclear industry.  
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“We must therefore calm the fears of French opinion by making it understand that, in a 
century of progress, its vague terrors are no more reasonable than those of our 
ancestors upon the advent of the railway, of electricity, and of cars. It is a national duty, 
because it conditions the development of atomic energy in France […]. We, who are 
most familiar with the details of the problem, who bear the responsibility, not only to 
weigh the risks, for ourselves and for our children, with objectivity, but also to inform, 
have this honour or liberating the men and women of France from their vague and 
senseless fears, and of restoring their trust” [Official Bulletin, Senate, session of 3 
November 1960, p. 1435].  
Finally, a challenge emerged in France, concerning the health detriment of the radioactivity 
used in medicine. A teacher, J. Pignero, took the initiative. In 1962 he created the Association 
against Radiological Hazard (ACDR) to react against the compulsory radiological 
examinations for schoolchildren. Previously, in 1957, the reading of a popular science 
magazine alerted him to the risks incurred by the children5. The association published a 
bulletin, Le danger radiologique (Radiological hazard) and acted to defend the few teachers 
who refused the imposition of these examinations on the children. In 1966, the ACDR was 
converted to the APRI (Association for the Protection of Ionising Radiation) in order to 
extend the associative battle to the civilian and military industry branches. This appears to 
have been the first organised opposition to the nuclear industry in France (Prendiville, 
1993).  
These various forms of public engagement implied an extension and a dissemination of the 
critical questionings on the subject of the risks of radioactivity, more or less independently 
of the institutional experts. This extension revealed the instability in identifying the 
threshold between the benefits and detriments, because science alone could not tell all (Beck, 
1986). Thus, a normally positive health use of radioactivity (X-ray examinations) could be 
challenged for its danger. Moreover, since the diversity of the uses was condensed into a 
risk bearing aggregate, stretching from the military industry to medical practices, it was not 
so much the problematics of waste that prevailed in these first challenges, as that of the 
potential hazard of any radioactive material. It took root in particular in the detachment of 
some of the scientists from the reassuring and faultless discourse of the atomic institution. 
Yet its public range remained limited by the small audience of the associative movements 
that relayed it on, apart from the more political movements focused on the rejection of the 
bomb. This is why these criticisms did not truly destabilise or delegitimise the power to say 
and to do of the players of the atomic complex, who generated most of the knowledge and 
the justifications of this industry. 
When the French government decided in 1975 to build a large nuclear power capability to 
contend with the oil energy crisis, this situation had barely changed. The social criticism of 
the atomic industry remained very discreet. It is true that the spectre of atomic war had 
receded and that a political consensus had emerged in France in favour of possession of 
nuclear weapons. As an emblem of this process, the French communist left, which long 
argued against nuclear weapons, finally came round to the idea that its possession by France 
was a guarantee of its independence. This caused a significant weakening of social 
mobilisation. And it is without any real debate in the parliament that the decision of this 
                                                 
5 According to testimony obtained by letter dated 25 July 1999. 
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new nuclear energy plan was taken, because in this case also, the political consensus existed 
to legitimise the energy independence of France. And yet, it is at the meeting point of the 
various criticisms that an anti-nuclear movement was taking structural shape in France, 
with varying strength according to location. This movement was not only heterogeneous in 
its composition, but also in its arguments and its highly diversified methods of combat. 
Thus we find three types of critical (Brunet, 2004a; 2006b). First, critics levelled by scientists 
who organise and popularise for the public the problems raised by the deployment of this 
energy industry in France. This is the case of Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear 
Energy (GSIEN). This group was founded by scientists, particularly nuclear physicists, after 
the “appeal of the 400” published by the daily Le Monde in February 1975. A total of 400 
scientists of the CNRS, the College du France and the universities were concerned about the 
risks incurred by the French nuclear power programme and asked the population to reject 
the installation of power plants as long as any doubts subsisted. They criticised the secrecy 
surrounding the nuclear industry. GSIEN published a journal La Gazette du Nucléaire which 
played a considerable role in checks and balances and hence in the democratic penetration 
of the nuclear industry. This journal was circulated to a nascent antinuclear movement. In 
this sense, GSIEN was the first independent associative expert. In second, the critics in 
which the nuclear power programme is assimilated with the installation of a police state 
ordering an overwhelming consumption disrespectful of nature. This type of critical, more 
political, was essentially levelled by libertarian and ecological movements as an extension of 
the criticism of capitalist production and consumption in 1968. Finally, we find the critical 
type “nimby”6. It is truly from this period that the problematics of radioactive waste began 
to take shape. The inquiry by a journalist among members of the PEON commission in this 
period was symptomatic of this slow movement. To the question of “waste?” he received 
the answer: “It is not a current problem. The storage of these wastes today raises no 
difficulties; they only occupy a few square metres. It will become a substantial problem in 
the year 2000”. (Simonnot, 1978). This issue was essentially centred on the production of 
industrial facilities qualified as nuclear, in other words, their fuels and wastes and releases. 
The uranium ore industry remained on the sidelines of this nascent problematics. 
Accordingly, its associated remnants are difficult to “recognise” as radioactive waste. This is 
precisely what we shall examine in the second part, covering the long term. 
3. From the remnants of the uranium mining industry to the qualification of 
radioactive waste  
We have seen that for geostrategic reasons, the context of national reticence and secrecy 
surrounding the development of the atomic industry internationally after the Second World 
War compelled France to take steps to assert its independence. Evidence of this is the 
creation of The CEA in 1945. And in setting up this new industry, uranium procurement 
became the CEA’s top priority. The first class of prospectors was operational in late 1945. 
From the outset, an ever growing series of survey missions crisscrossed France, focusing on 
granitic formations. Some were already known from radium mining. This is the case of 
small deposits known before the war and located on the eastern margin of the Massif 
Central. As to the remainder, prospecting missions were spread over a vast area forming a V 
                                                 
6 Nimby: the acronym means “not in my backyard”. It is intended to reflect a refusal by future residents, 
not of this industry as a whole, but of observing the installation of a risky industrial facility nearby. 
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from Brittany to the Morvan and passing through the Massif Central. Others, like the 
Limousin, were prospected for the first time. In this region, some twenty kilometres north of 
the city of Limoges, the richest uranium shows in France and the most promising in terms of 
quantity were discovered in late 1948 (Paucard, 1992). They allowed the industrial mining of 
uranium ore and, from the late Fifties, chemical treatment to produce yellow cake. The 
outcome was an industrial configuration which lasted half a century and caused an 
upheaval in this small rural region, formerly dedicated to agriculture. Like any mining 
industry, the production of uranium led to the buildup of overburden and tailings. Three 
successive periods can be distinguished to understand how these tailings were transformed 
into radioactive waste. They corresponded to different social configurations in which the 
legitimacy of statement and action tended towards their qualification. Whereas the tailings 
were treated routinely in the early period, and only raised questions in the second, the 
analysis of the third period reveals a conflictual context, with growing, permanent, expert 
and multifaceted vigilance with regard to their management as radioactive waste.  
3.1 The good old days of uranium: The era of arrangements and convertible industrial 
remnants  
The first configuration, the good old days of uranium, lasted about twenty-five years, from 
1949 to 1973. It reflected an industrial mining scheme in which the tailings were treated as 
harmless. As for any mining practice at the time, they were either returned to the 
environment, or were used for other purposes. The monopoly of knowledge and power over 
them belonged to the CEA. It alone analysed, guided decisions and set the standards. The 
knowledge of these tailings was therefore severely restricted by such practices, especially 
since the mining industry was dissociated from the nuclear industry. Ultimately, risk is 
intrinsic to mining activity. Only the environment is risk-free.  
Because of its duration, this industrial configuration was a structuring factor. It displayed 
many features. First, it was localised, limited to a few communes of the Monts d’Ambazac. 
Second, it was closed in on itself. The few kilometres distance from the city of Limoges were 
a virtual barrier separating the rural and urban worlds. Their links were limited to 
traditional trading between countryside and city. Besides, this small rural region was the 
water reservoir of the city of Limoges7. This configuration was also dominated by the CEA’s 
mining division, made up of mining engineers and geologists. So, the job organisation of 
mining production is doubly structured by a geological department, in charge of 
prospecting, of measuring ore assays, and a mining department which extracts the ore. The 
Mining Division corresponds to the company which, in addition to these two major 
technical departments, contains an equipment maintenance and management department 
and an administrative department. And a significant number of the mine workers were 
former farmers or their offspring. Moreover, after the discoveries of large uranium deposits, 
the CEA supplemented the ore mining process with on-site treatment in a plant built in 1957 
in the commune of Bessines. For economic reasons relating to the low concentration of the 
ore, the CEA quickly decided to concentrate the uranium ore chemically on-site. The 
product obtained was a paste called yellow cake, which had a uranium content of about 
                                                 
7 Since the 19th Century, the City of Limoges has installed reservoirs in the form of ponds, for its water 
supply.  
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90%. This cake was then sent to plants in southern France to undergo final treatment to 
fabricate nuclear fuel by purification and enrichment. Before the Bessines factory went on 
stream, the CEA transported and processed the ore from Limoges in the Paris area, to the 
Bouchet factory. 
Between this industry and the population, a shared positive vision emerged of its 
production within a set of arrangements. Uranium ore, an element of an acted nature, 
became the new wealth of this area and the symbol of its revival. It became a positive 
heritage. This situation did not discount the “drawbacks” engendered by the proximity of 
the mine to the villages: collapses of cultivated land, wastewater dumping into the fields, 
deafening noises and dust clouds from the mine sites. Yet formulated as such, they did not 
bring into question the mining industry and its vocation for the inhabitants: as the driver of 
local economic development. Depending on their characteristics, these drawbacks were 
dealt with under individualised arrangements on an individual case basis, or collectively. 
Thus, for example, the collective problem of access to water could be solved by its handling 
by the mining division. Indeed, when the mining division was installed in the Fifties, a 
collective water supply did not exist, and water was drawn from individual wells. Very 
often, mining operations intersected the springs and dried up the wells. The mining division 
then took charge of the collective water supply. In exchange, these arrangements served to 
reinforce its domination over the area. Thus when the mediation of the mayors was required 
to address collective drawbacks, the negotiations always took place in the office of the 
director of the mining division, a venue that was deeply symbolic of the exercise of this 
unchallenged domination.  
As for the treatment of the remains from the industrial process, it was completely 
unmarked. Two types of waste coexisted: overburden from ore extraction, and mill tailings 
from chemical treatment. The first were the rock containing the ore, whose economic value 
was below the assay. Considered as routine and harmless, they were used as backfill for 
road building projects, or to plug a mine. Part of it was also used in individual 
arrangements. The latter were present as soon as the Bessines factory became operational. In 
the form of reddish wet sand, they represented an approximately equivalent mass to the 
crushed ore. Indeed, in terms of mass, given the very low uranium concentration in the rock, 
yellow cake represents an infinitesimal part of the total mass of ore treated, about 2 to 5 ppm 
depending on each case. They were handled in two ways. The first was burial in the 
excavations of the open pit mines. Thus like the overburden, they were “returned to nature” 
without any further action. A second, in very small quantities and less frequent was 
disseminated across the region for masonry. So, examples are not rare of individuals 
residing on the mining zone who used these residues, some to make a floor slab for a home, 
build a workshop, obviously unaware of the radioactive hazard associated with the very 
high radon emanations released by the radioactivity remaining in these residues. This raised 
no problem: the radioactive composition was considered close to zero because the chemical 
treatment was supposed to extract all the uranium. 
In actual fact, the only recognised risks were contained within the strict limits of the 
production process. Exposure to these risks concerned the miners, especially the workers. 
Some of these risks fell into the very broad class of mining operations: cave-ins, silica 
inhalation. Others were classed as radioactive risks. From the mid-Fifties, a more 
sophisticated vigilance, taken over by the CEA, was exercised over the work of the miners, 
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with the installation of mine aeration systems and radioactivity measurements, both 
collective and individual. The chief hazard identified was radon. It was discharged to the 
exterior by the ventilation systems. A dosimetric measurement system was set up at the 
same time. In 1951, the CEA formed an inspection body, the Radiation Protection 
Department (SPR) reporting directly to the High-Commissioner for the mining sector. A 
methodology and a metrology were then set up (Bernhard & al, 1992). 
3.2 Nuclear discord: The mining industry, a link of the nuclear industry  
The second period, the era of nuclear discord, began in the mid-Seventies and ended twenty 
years later when Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires (COGEMA) announced the 
indefinite suspension of uranium mining in the Limousin. This period reflected a new 
industrial configuration, more open and intense than the previous one, with sharp tensions. 
The construction of a major nuclear power capability in France demanded much higher 
uranium output than in the past. At the same time, criticism of the government decision 
roiled across France. It impacted uranium mining, henceforth considered an inseparable 
component of the nuclear industry. Uranium was no longer acknowledged to be the only 
positive asset. And tentatively, the issue of waste materialised.  
The government decision in 1974 to schedule the construction of nuclear power plants had 
two major consequences for the CEA’s mining sector. One concerned its organisation. To 
streamline the new energy sector founded on the nuclear industry, the government decided 
to split off all operations associated with the nuclear fuel cycle from the CEA, ranging from 
mining to waste reprocessing. It created a subsidiary in 1976 for the purpose, named 
COGEMA. The second consequence was the transformation of the local industrial 
configuration in the Limousin. Annual uranium production had to be doubled. This goal 
implied fresh prospecting and new mine sites. The mining division therefore expanded its 
operating perimeter and went on a hiring spree. A number of comparative figures can 
provide an idea of the transformation of the mining division in a few short years. In 1973, it 
produced 590 tonnes of uranium; in 1980, 1002 tonnes of uranium for 620,300 tonnes of ore 
extracted. At the same time, its area of occupancy rose from 350 to 1300 hectares, divided 
into 3300 registered plots. Its workforce also grew from 650 in 1975 to 1000 in 1980. The new 
mine workers were outsiders. The industrial configuration which, until then, was closed in 
upon itself, opened up. But the extension of its activities henceforth became a problem for a 
large segment of the population, farmers and others, who discovered and attempted to 
legitimise environmental issues with local officials and administrative authorities. The 
words “pollution”, “nature protection”, “environmental problems” became current, in 
opposition to the earlier popularisation. These words come from the new environmentalist 
vocabulary used by the national associations of conservation and environmental scientists. 
They are then taken over by the State when it created, in 1973, the first environment 
ministry in France. (Charvolin, 1997). Local officials passed the word on to COGEMA’s 
mining division and the State authorities. The texture of the individual arrangements which 
hitherto cemented this configuration disintegrated. Conflicts broke out, essentially 
collective. Some inhabitants of the mining zone set up owners’ and environmental 
conservation associations. Antinuclear groups were also formed, especially in Limoges. 
They decried the risks of radioactive pollution of the water catchment basins of their city by 
mining operations. These conflicts were emblematic of the way in which environmental 
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problems generated by the uranium industry and the solutions made thereto were posed 
from then on. They also helped to grasp the conditions of the emerging issue of radioactive 
waste.  
A conflict about the definition of the situation broke out on two levels with the mining 
division. Faced with the industrial breakthrough, these new associative players, pursuing 
their favourite themes, became spokesmen of a nature and of a living framework that 
deserved protection, and/or radical critics of a risky energy policy generating very long 
term waste. In the former case, the associative arguments drew on sensitive past experience: 
the noise generated by mining, the drying up of the springs, the degradation of the 
landscape, were criticised. Water and landscaps were defended as common heritage of an 
abused nature (Dorst, 1965) and as a positive asset whose use was jeopardised by pollution 
and other industrial detriments. In the latter case, the scientific and critical arguments of the 
GSIEN (Gsien, 1977) concerning the nuclear industry were mobilised. Appropriated by the 
antinuclear associations, they were disseminated among the population of Limoges, so that 
the conflict around the risk of radioactive pollution of drinking water that crystallised in 
autumn 1979 was acknowledged to be a problem by the municipality and the Prefect, the 
representative of the State. The confrontation found legitimacy in areas which were no 
longer those of the mining division but those of the State. In the negotiations initiated in the 
presence of local officials, while the State obliged COGEMA to protect the water resources 
of the city from industrial releases, the director of the mining division nevertheless 
continued to deny the problem. At a joint meeting chaired by the Prefect and attended by 
the Mayor of Limoges and the director of the mining division, the latter offered an answer:  
“Yes, Prefect, we agree in principle, but provided that it is the prefectural authority that 
issues the demand, and that it is perfectly clear that it is not a problem of pollution that 
needs settling, but a problem of psychological damage. In other words, the crowd 
psychology needs to be corrected.” [Prefecture of the Haute-Vienne, "Radioactivity of 
waters supplying the city of Limoges." - Proceedings of the briefing of 08/10/79. 
Mimeographed].  
At the same time, the State and the nuclear establishment were denounced for their habit of 
withholding information about radioactivity monitoring measurements. Short of a 
suspension of the nuclear power programme, which remained its ultimate target – this 
locally implied suspending the inauguration of new mine operations and the shutdown or 
slowdown of those incurring a risk for the environment or for the population – the local 
antinuclear movement defends two others claims. The first is more intensive monitoring of 
the radioactivity of drinking water and publication of the data. The second is the creation of 
an enquiry commission to conduct an epidemiological survey by independent bodies.  
It is in the tumult of this conflict that the nature protection and antinuclear associations also 
alerted the public to practices they considered dubious. These included waste dumping at 
night in an open pit mine by COGEMA. The CEA, which closed its uranium concentration 
plant in the Paris area to the Bouchet factory, decided to transfer the tailings to the 
Limousin. The arguments volunteered to justify this practice was their harmlessness and the 
fact that having originated in the Limousin, they were merely going back to where they 
came from. The answer offered by the Prefect of the Haute-Vienne in 1979 to a worried local 
official:  
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“[…] At that time, there was no treatment plant on the spot and the ore was sent by 
lorry to the Paris area, to the Bouchet factory installed by the CEA. The treatment of the 
ore led to the production of a few thousand tonnes of sterile, just like the sterile at the 
Bessines factory: these harmless materials are now returning. It is almost like going 
back home.” [press article in Le Populaire, 15 février 1979]  
The semantics were ingenuous: to qualify mine tailings as “overburden” meant to treat 
them as any routine form of residue. Their “problem” was nonexistent, and their sole 
admissible identity was the one attributed by COGEMA. This identity implied an ignorance 
of the radioactive composition of these residues, and denied the existence of any risk. The 
associations lacked the means to counter these assertions. Their criticism was limited to 
inflating the challenge to this industry by arguments targeting waste, which contributed to 
its disqualification. It sustained a powerful tension between the positive and negative 
aspects of the industry. Yet too many economic and social challenges precluded its full and 
unchallenged legitimacy. This is why the issue of radioactive waste from the mining 
industry was not identified during this period, although emerging details tended in that 
direction.  
3.3 Nuclear uncertainty: Managing and qualifying the remnants 
The third and final period, of nuclear uncertainty, began in 1988 with the announcement of 
the speedy termination of industrial activity. The social configuration, hitherto centred on 
industrial operations, and the problems raised by uranium production, were progressively 
transformed into a solidly environmental configuration that would never end. From 
uranium as acted nature, its remnants were considered acting nature. Indeed the radioactive 
waste qualification process applied to the residues now entailed permanent vigilance and 
accompaniment. A priori, it’s almost impossible to fix the term because the respective time 
scales for men and radioactivity emitted by these wastes are immeasurable. This situation 
resulted from the nuclear establishment’s progressive loss of hegemony of statement and 
action with regard to these remnants (Brunet, 2004b). Its weakness had three causes. First, it 
originates the strengthening of the expertise of the antinuclear movement in France with the 
emergence of the associative expert, who scientifically challenged the arguments of the 
nuclear establishment. Second, the local public authorities, no longer anticipating any 
positive spinoffs from the industry, were vulnerable to the arguments of the associations. 
Finally, thirdly, the nationwide nuclear establishment was forced into reform, given its 
relative failure to propose an operationalisation of the comprehensive management of all 
radioactive waste, high and low level alike. A correlation therefore existed between this 
weakness, the obvious shift in acceptable standards on radioactive waste management, and 
the stigmatising image projected by the recognition of the remnants as radioactive waste. 
Nevertheless, the environmental configuration remained subject to regulatory practice. 
With the onset of the Nineties, the mining industry declined and collapsed in late 1995. 
COGEMA’s decision in 1988 to stop any further mining in France had its economic 
underpinnings: to mine only profitable orebodies. The low price of uranium on the world 
market made Limousin ore expensive compared to those of Canada and Africa. Despite the 
very intense but dispersed labour unrest, the mine workers and their unions had to give in, 
and they quickly disappeared from the social landscape. While the local political officials 
favoured the resumption of mining, others, urban political officials, promoted the idea of a 
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“green” Limousin for the mining area, oriented towards housing and tourism. The 
construction of expressways between Limoges and Monts d’Ambazac shortened the 
distances and many citydwellers came to live there. At the same time, in the late Nineties, 
the inauguration of a leisure facility on St Pardoux Lake made it a relaxation centre for the 
population of Limoges and for the tourists. That is why these urban political officials 
formulated a twofold demand, non-negotiable for them: that COGEMA should finance a 
conversion plan for the mining territory, and that it clean up the traces left by fifty years of 
uranium mining.  
Yet when mining operations ended, more than twenty million tonnes of residues generated 
by the industrial process remained on the old mining territory, stored in open pit mines. 
Added to this mass were wastes of all types, already present or anticipated. The industrial 
logic of burial for many long years had been fully implemented. Thus, empty drums that 
previously contained radioactive substances and originated directly from COGEMA and 
CEA industrial facilities, were regularly dumped in thousands in the mine pits. And in the 
guise of a conversion project, COGEMA planned to set up an interim storage facility for 200 
000 tonnes of depleted uranium produced by the fuel enrichment cycle. All these factors 
tended to project a negative and stigmatising image on the region, one of a “nuclear 
dustbin”. The unfair tradeoff that triggered it contributed to a dual upheaval symbolic and 
political. Symbolic, when the uranium converted to residues was no longer considered a 
positive asset, but became a negative legacy. Political, when the radioactive, economic, 
environmental and health hazards harboured by this negative legacy, whether real or 
imaginary, soon spread and tended to convert the officials to the position defended by the 
environmentalist associations. The industrial configuration blurred and vanished, leaving in 
its place an environmental configuration in which COGEMA, the elected officials, State 
representatives, associations and experts were the players. The experts then played a central 
role in the dynamic of this configuration. They compiled and assessed the controversial 
knowledge about the remnants, given the turmoil that governed the way in which the 
questions were asked and answered. This knowledge, no doubt unstable, was nevertheless 
sufficient to qualify and to manage the remnants.  
Two types of expert faced off within this environmental configuration: the establishment 
expert and the establishing expert (Bonnet, 2006a): the first largely came from the nuclear 
establishment itself. This period of the late Nineties witnessed the generalised treatment as a 
problematic issue of all radioactive waste and, as a corollary, a transformation of the 
institutions which possessed and produced the expertise of the State in this field. We cannot 
expand further on this issue in this chapter. However, it is clear that the progressive 
inclusion of the remnants of the uranium industry in the issue of all radioactive waste 
facilitated the process of its qualification. This transformation stemmed from processes of 
differentiation and independence. For example, the French National Radioactive Waste 
Management Agency (ANDRA) was created from a CEA Department. In 1981, with the 
passage of the first French bill on the nuclear industry specifically and exclusively 
addressing radioactive waste management, ANDRA became independent of the CEA. This 
transformation impacted the radioactive waste management policy, the nuclear facility 
safety policy, and the health and environmental safety policy of the population. The French 
State did not succeed in resolving the management of high and medium level nuclear waste. 
Underground storage alternatives were vigorously challenged by the public and the 
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antinuclear groups. From this point of view, the antinuclear groups did not conceal their 
strategy. One of the routes for securing the shutdown of the nuclear industry in France was 
to demonstrate the “intestinal blockage” of the system. This strategy consisted in focusing 
public attention on the waste. Insofar as no transfer solution was accepted by the potential 
host population (deep burial, underground storage with possible rehandling), the wastes 
remained where they were generated and ultimately cluttered the area. Added to the 
establishment expert, arguing by differentiation, were the university laboratories which 
assumed a role in offering expertise, in which the monopoly of the nuclear establishment 
disappeared.  
During the same period, and at the same time, the associative players transformed 
themselves into the typical ideal figure of the associative expert, with features specific to the 
Limousin. This figure assumed two forms. On the one hand, it inspired the local 
environmental defence associations and antinuclear groups, who together created the 
Limousin anti-waste coordination (CLADE) in 1992. This flexible federative organisation 
focused exclusively on the “remnants” of the mining industry. Its essential demand was the 
conduct of a radiological investigation which, independently of the nuclear establishment, 
could assess the environmental and health hazards incurred by these harmful remnants. The 
prize was the definitive qualification of these remnants as radioactive wastes. It adjusted its 
practices to this outcome. Thus, without awaiting the independent investigation that it 
demanded from the authorities, it concentrated on the burden of proof that bedevilled it and 
forced it to mobilise science to prove the existence of dangers to health. On the other hand, 
this associative expert figure also engaged the Commission for Independent Research and 
Information on Radioactivity (CRII-RAD), an associative radioactivity measurement 
laboratory. CRII-RAD is a non-profit association created in 1986 to counter the statements of 
the authorities and experts of the nuclear establishment, who, after Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant explosion, argued that the radioactive cloud had “stopped” at the French 
border, and that there had been no significant radioactive fallout on the national territory. 
This association enjoys the original privilege of having founded a laboratory for measuring 
the radioactivity that is independent of the state and nuclear authorities, with a nationwide 
audience. It is therefore at the junction of the activities of the local association, which 
relentlessly denounced the potentially polluted locations, took samples in suspect places of 
the old mining zone by observing the procedures recommended by the CRII-RAD and those 
of the associative laboratory which analysed and interpreted the results, that this associative 
expert unveiled its reality as a player and, progressively, imposed a new and critical 
viewpoint on the remnants (Brunet, 2006c). There is therefore an important qualitative 
change in the practice of associative expertise. Without the GSIEN having disappeared from 
the associative landscape, the investigation of the antinuclear movement no longer relied 
exclusively on a critique of the documents produced by the nuclear establishment, but on 
independent evidence produced in the laboratory. This is one of the reasons why COGEMA, 
the experts of the nuclear establishment and the authorities were compelled to re-examine 
the knowledge and management of these “remnants” and to recognise them as radioactive 
waste.  
Firstly, the associative expert forced COGEMA, via the State, to take more restrictive 
protective measures in its winding-up operations. But above all, with the support of the 
local authorities, it succeeded in imposing the satisfaction of its central claim: the setting up 
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of an independent investigation of all the mine sites. The Prefect decided in fact to set up a 
Local Information Commission (CLI). This commission aims to provide information “on the 
risks incurred by ionising radiation pertaining to the activity of the uranium site”8. The 
composition of the CLI serves to gather together in a single place all the players in this 
environmental issue: the services of the State, the operator, the eco-environmental and 
antinuclear associations, local authorities and the experts. This decision is also the 
translation of many reports produced or under preparation of the State Services and also of 
the Parliamentary Office for Assessing Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST) on 
the mining residues that have supported this qualification (Ministère de l’Environnement, 
1991, 1993 ; OPECST, 1992). Thus, mining residues were definitively classed in the category 
of radioactive waste, which implied a need for management and the establishment of new 
standards. It is in this new setting of institutionalised consultation that a radiological 
investigation of the mine zone was decreed.  
To allay suspicion, the investigation was funded by the local authorities and took the form 
of a joint investigation between the CRII-RAD and COGEMA laboratories. The definition of 
the measurement plan and its implementation lay at the heart of the conflict on the most 
appropriate definition of the situation. It is therefore not surprising that it was the subject of 
lengthy and difficult negotiations between the players of the CLI. And when in 1994, the 
results had to be interpreted by comparing the measurements of the two laboratories, the 
players of the environmental configuration were unable to agree, leading to the breakup of 
the CLI. The investigation, all the way to the assessment, clashed on two conflicts of 
interpretation which prevented settling the argument between the associative movement 
and COGEMA. First, in this mining area, how the part of the so-called natural radioactivity 
and that provided by industrial activities? This question evidenced an attempt to establish 
COGEMA’s liability. And besides, is the risk assessed at the source, within the boundaries 
of the mining sites, or is it, according to the regulations in force, assessed in the 
environment, outside these boundaries? In the former case, waste monitoring was a public 
matter; and the second, it remained a private affair, the domain of COGEMA, because access 
to the source remained prohibited. Thus, while everybody agreed that the results of the two 
laboratories were identical. But for the associative movement, they offered evidence of the 
existence of risks which must be neutralised at the source, whereas for COGEMA, they 
confirmed the absence of any danger to human health and justified his self-inspection.  
3.4 Continuing tensions between expertise, democracy and social norms 
The democratic trial seemed powerless to withstand the ordeal of scientific controversy. 
Precisely because the scientific controversy extends continuously beyond the narrow issues 
of Science. These were constantly articulated in terms of social norms: an environmental 
hazard or a health risk always includes more than just scientific data (Beck, 1986). Both 
reflect essentially normative points of view drawing not only on scientific reasoning but also 
on social reasoning. Since it is around this model, initiated by the incomplete experiment of 
the CLI, that two-track ad hoc procedures for consultation and negotiation punctuated every 
new problem posed by acting nature. It brings together the elected officials, State 
Administration, COGEMA and the experts, which reached the public domain in line with 
                                                 
8 Prefectoral decision of 7 January 1992.  
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the action model promoted by the associative expert. Moreover the action model was 
completed by a legal expertise of the associative movement. All the actions of COGEMA and 
of the State on radioactive waste management are the subject of closely attentive legal 
monitoring by the local associative movement. In other words, the recognised legitimacy of 
the environmental issue by expert knowledge, failed in setting up truly permanent systems 
for consultation and negotiation, that is to say political. Only acting nature, via the 
spokesmen experts, who claimed to be its interpreters, conditioned its frequency, intensity 
and scale. 
It follows that AREVA Company, formerly COGEMA9, like any mine producer, wanted to 
leave Limousin for good after the industrial sites had been redeveloped, and not 
rehabilitated as this company suggests (Bavoux & Guiollard, 1998). It was forced to remain 
on the spot. In recent years, the State should take its place for a strictly indeterminate period. 
Its task was precisely to “contain” this set of remnants now qualified as “radioactive waste” 
and to meet the standards whose level of acceptability ceaselessly became more restrictive. 
In other words, while the nuclear establishment was planning to “return these wastes to 
nature”, according to its own terminology, to forget about them, they now became, probably 
for an unlimited period, the subject of increasingly intensive monitoring, which forced it to 
remain nearby. This obligation of surveillance and retention was not simply that. AREVA 
NC and the State are resistant to this because it represents a cost to both economic and 
symbolic. More the cost of monitoring work grows, less the industry shows that it was 
profitable. Similarly, more problems appear, less engineering, over the long term, shows its 
ability to solve them. It’s in fact ceaselessly updated by the vigilance of the associative 
movement. This monitoring is therefore fragile. Indeed, it is largely contingent on the 
capacity of the movements coming from society to exercise this control which, necessarily, 
remains discontinuous. The militant capacities of the associative movement are very fragile 
(Brunet, 2004c; 2006b). More generally, above and beyond the issues of radioactive waste, 
this situation raises the question of the role of public, the associative movements and experts 
in a renewed technical democracy. In this context, certainly, the State should reconsider the 
submission of general interest for the sole benefit of short-term economic, which denies the 
existence of waste and problems. It needs also to recognize and take account of public 
engagement in its attention to the commons with their coloration positive or negative, as are 
the radioactive waste. In the same times, the public must recognize all the commons that are 
part of the same story. This is certainly one of the most important political challenges of the 
future of our industrial societies. 
4. Conclusion 
The socio-historical analysis of an industry helps to understand the place that gradually take 
its waste. In France, in its productive phase, the uranium industry lasted about fifty years. In 
fact it has no end. Three periods were able to be identified. Each has a very different 
relationship to his remains. Their succession shows a progressive visibility and legitimacy of 
his remains to the characterization of radioactive waste. The first period, which lasts nearly 
twenty five years, shows that the remains do not exist. Either they are "returned to nature," 
either they are used for other purposes. Uranium is considered by all actors as a common 
                                                 
9 COGEMA changed its name in 2001 and is now called AREVA NC. 
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unchallenged. Account only the nature acted. The second period corresponds to a strong 
growth of the mining industry. This one is disputed because it disrupts the natural 
environment. Two commons are then in opposition. Water and uranium, respectively, 
correspond to urban and rural social worlds different. In addition, by the action of anti-
nuclear groups, the uranium industry becomes an integral part of the nuclear industry. 
Their challenge is only to delegitimize the reassuring speech experts from the State and the 
operator (CEA and COGEMA) about the environmental and health risks associated with 
radioactivity, affecting the water. However, this challenge is limited because it based solely 
on the data produced by the nuclear institution itself. Also, in this context of strong activity, 
industrial remains are hardly questioned. The third period, which has no end, starts when 
the industrial decline and the operator informs of the imminent closure of the mines. From 
that moment, the remains are real issues and the problem of radioactive waste emerges. It 
develops in a context of strong challenges that mobilize elected urban and antinuclear 
groups against the state and the operator. Uranium as common fades along with its 
industry. Only exist remnants that become problematic. It then becomes necessary to 
identify, qualify as radioactive waste, measure and evaluate them in terms of environmental 
and health risks. Antinuclear associations have acquired a capacity to produce data 
themselves through the figure of the associative expert. But conflicts over these activities can 
not diminish for two reasons. The democratic machinery around these radioactive wastes is 
limited and fragile. And also the actors for the most part unaware of the history of the 
industrial process in its entirety, including the production of its common, positive and 
negative. Despite appearances, our society built on the basis of science and technology, is 
fundamentally a political society. 
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